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“Splendid isolation” has been, and continues to be, a phrase of 
convenience rather than widely agreed and undisputed historical 
fact. There remains ambiguity over precisely what it entailed. Lord 
Salisbury, British Prime Minister 1895-1902, and Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs from 1895-1900, used the phrase ironically for 
those who believed splendid isolation was possible.1 Historians have 
mainly argued that the criteria for splendid isolation was either the 
absence of a peacetime alliance,2 or an absence from European 
involvement. Britain was in isolation in the 1890s and early 1900s, 
with a preference for ad hoc, vague agreements rather than concrete 
alliances, contrasting with Germany.3 Because of the 
historiographical debate over what splendid isolation entailed, there 
are debates over when it ended. It has been argued that splendid 
isolation ended only when Britain was obligated to become 
militarily involved in Europe, which would place the end of splendid 
isolation much later. This will not be explored here because it 
generally ignores two important points. Firstly, Britain was never 
fully obligated to go to war in Europe. Secondly, an involvement did 
not have to be militarily, it could be Britain becoming further 
diplomatically involved in Europe. Rather, this essay will explore 
splendid isolation as both: ending on 30 January 1902, with the 
signing of the Anglo-Japanese agreement and ending in 1905-06, 
with Britain becoming embroiled in European affairs during the 
Moroccan Crisis. The Anglo-Japanese agreement, despite being a 
regional pact, ended splendid isolation as it was a peacetime alliance 
with terms that theoretically obliged Britain to go to war under 
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1 David Steele, Lord Salisbury: a political biography (London: UCL Press, 
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3 M.R.D Foot, British foreign policy since 1898, (London: Hutchinson's 
University Library, 1956), p. 30. 
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certain circumstances.4 Furthermore, this regional pact had global 
ramifications that impacted Britain’s ‘aloofness from Europe’,5 
therefore making void the two aforementioned criteria of splendid 
isolation. Conversely, other historians argue that splendid isolation 
did not end until Britain was explicitly engaged in European affairs 
and quarrels. 6 In this case, the Moroccan Crisis can be seen as the 
ending of splendid isolation,7 as Britain explicitly sided with France 
against the mercurial Kaiser Wilhelm, thus becoming involved in 
Europe.8 This essay will focus on the impact of the German 
battlefleet and Paul Kennedy’s notion of ‘imperial overstretch’ on 
the Anglo-Japanese agreement and the Moroccan Crisis, as these 
two events best represent the end of splendid isolation, depending 
which side of the historiographical debate one takes. Imperial 
overstretch occurs when the primary global power’s expanded 
strategic commitments lead to an increase in military spending that 
overburdens their economic strength, which was a key facet in 
Britain’s abandonment of splendid isolation.9   
     
Tirpitz’ Battlefleet 
The German battlefleet was devised by the State Secretary of the 
Imperial Naval Office, Alfred von Tirpitz. The programme 
commenced with the Navy Law of 1898, which fixed the number of 
battleships to be built each year.10 Bills were regularly passed to 
increase the size and strength of the battlefleet with the Second Navy 
Law of 1900, and a Novelle in 1908 and 1912.11 The battlefleet was 
built with an anti-British focus, shown with Tirpitz’s discussion of 
 
4 George Monger, The End of Isolation. British Foreign Policy 1900-1907 
(London: Nelson, 1963), p. 60. 
5 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, economic change and 
military conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana, 1989), p. 252 argues the 
Anglo-Japanese agreement had impacts on European relations as it made a third-
party intervention unlikely from either France or Britain. 
6 See A.J.P Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 400 and Thomas Otte, The China question: 
great power rivalry and British isolation, 1894-1905 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), p. 306. 
7 For discussions of the events and aftermath of the Moroccan Crisis, see A.J.P 
Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, pp. 427-441. 
8 Thomas Otte, The Foreign Office Mind: the making of British foreign policy, 
1865-1914 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 299. 
9 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, economic change and 
military conflict from 1500 to 2000, pp. 523-533. 
10 Jonathon Steinberg, Yesterday's deterrent: Tirpitz and the birth of the German 
battle fleet (Aldershot: Gregg revivals, 1992), p. 190. 
11 Michael Ephkenans, ‘The Naval Race before 1914: Was a Peaceful Outcome 
Thinkable?’, in Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (ed), An Improbable 
War: The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture before 
1914, (Oxford: Berghahn, 2007), p. 133. 
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rivalling Britain in preliminary proposals to Kaiser Wilhelm II in 
1897.12 Tension with Tirpitz’s naval programme was felt in Britain 
as early as 4 February 1898. The First Naval Lord Sir Frederick 
Richards argued battleship construction should not be reduced, in 
view of what was happening with powers outside France and 
Russia.13 However, those were merely rumblings. The impact on 
Britain’s foreign policy, caused by the German battlefleet up to the 
signing of the Anglo-Japanese agreement, was negligible. In 1902, 
the Royal Navy considered France and Russia to be the navies that 
were most dangerous to British interests.14 However, the German 
battlefleet had a stronger impact on Britain by the time of the 
Moroccan Crisis of 1905-6. By 1905, Sir John Fisher, First Sea 
Lord, took up various counter-measures to the German fleet, 
including concentrating on European waters and maintaining 
numerical superiority.15 He even considered a preventative 
‘Copenhagen style’ attack on the German fleet, supported by arch-
Conservatives in the British parliament,16 but this was opposed by 
many more than the few who supported it. In 1905, Tirpitz and the 
German Admiralty also prepared for a naval war against Britain,17 
however, this was unlikely and is better explained as general ‘worst-
case scenario’ planning. Elite and public animosity between 
Germany and Britain18 accompanied public rows between German 
Chancellor Prince Bulow and Liberal Unionist Joseph 
Chamberlain;19 the latter previously being the chief instigator of an 
alliance with Germany until 1902.20 However, while tensions 
between Britain and Germany, resulting from the German 
battlefleet, had palpably risen from 1902 to the Moroccan Crisis, this 
should not be overemphasised. The Moroccan Crisis started in 
March 1905, whereas Anglo-German naval rivalry did not 
exponentially grow until after the launch of the HMS Dreadnought 
around a year later, and even then, only became clear around 1908.21 
Therefore, the German battlefleet had an incredibly negligible 
 
12 Steinberg, p. 201. 
13 ibid, p. 167. 
14 F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States 
System 1814-1914 (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005), p. 270. 
15 Volker Berghahn, Germany and the approach of war in 1914 (London: 
Macmillan, 1973), p. 48. 
16 Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World 
War, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 48.  
17 Michael Epkenhans, p. 119. 
18 Margaret MacMillan, The War that ended Peace: The Road to 1914 (London: 
Profile Books, 2013), p.130. 
19 Otte, The Foreign Office mind, p. 274. 
20 Zara Steiner, The foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 500. 
21 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 253. 
3
Brewster: Challenging Pre-War Anglo-German Antagonism




impact on Britain’s decision to ally with Japan in 1902. Similarly, it 
had a minor impact on Britain’s decision to become involved in the 
Moroccan Crisis, as the age of Anglo-German Naval rivalry was 
later. Thus, another explanation must be given as to why Britain left 
splendid isolation and signed a defensive alliance with Japan, and 
why they became embroiled in European quarrels during the 
Moroccan Crisis siding with France over Germany. 
    
The Anglo-Japanese Agreement 
Upon retiring in 1907, Thomas Sanderson, Permanent 
Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, described Britain as a ‘huge 
giant sprawling over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes 
stretching in every direction’. 22 He used this metaphor to refer to 
the perception of Britain abroad. Significantly, Britain was not the 
only ‘giant’, and was being pressed all over the globe by other Great 
Powers with strained resources, resulting in the term ‘imperial 
overstretch’. Imperial overstretch would bring Britain to the Anglo-
Japanese agreement and to their stance during the Moroccan Crisis, 
thus having an important role in the ending of splendid isolation. 
Strained resources were visible in Africa and the Americas, but it 
was fear of Russia in the Far East and Central Asia, that dictated 
foreign policy. Britain’s imperial overstretch in the Americas is 
shown in their dealings with the USA. Britain had started cultivating 
a relationship with the USA as early as 1898. The Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty, 18 November 1901, demonstrated Britain’s strained 
resources and how they needed to look for support. Ultimately, the 
treaty recognised British inferiority in American waters.23 The USA 
was given the sole right to build a canal from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific and simultaneously, the Royal Navy left the Caribbean 
where Britain’s interests were now governed by the USA.24 In 
return, Britain received cordiality from the USA and vital resources 
were freed. While this cannot be deemed the end of splendid 
isolation, it is a good example of Britain recognising their ‘imperial 
overstretch’ and was a milestone towards the Anglo-Japanese 
agreement and the end of splendid isolation.  
The Anglo-Japanese agreement was chiefly caused by 
imperial overstretch in the Far East and Central Asia, however, 
British activities and interest in Africa also played a role, because 
imperial overstretch was inextricably linked worldwide. The role 
Africa played in the Anglo-Japanese agreement was secondary to 
 
22 Otte, The Foreign Office Mind, p. 312. 
23 David Reynolds, Britannia overruled: British policy and world power in the 
twentieth century (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 70. 
24 Young, p. 27. 
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the role Asia played, in that African activities- particularly the Boer 
War- served to remind Britain of the dangers that Russia posed to 
their Asian interests. The European condemnation of the Boer War 
of 1899-1902 came as a great shock to Britain’s leaders and 
demonstrated Britain’s isolation.25 The real significance of the Boer 
War, in the signing of the Anglo-Japanese agreement, was the 
impact it had on Britain’s inability to act forcefully in Asia, at a time 
when the rest of the world was seemingly focused in this region, 
which only intensified the feeling of isolation.26 Fundamentally, the 
Boer War highlighted Britain’s imperial overstretch as they were 
unable to exhort all their efforts against the bigger threat by Russia 
in Asia. Russia took the lead in East Asia, which caused discomfort 
for British policy-makers and the Foreign Office.27 Despite the 
exhausting efforts on the Boer War, Asia dominated British foreign 
policy in the late 1890s and early 1900s. Taylor convincingly argues 
’China had overtaken Turkey as the sick man and between 1897 and 
1905 the future of China determined the relations between the Great 
Powers’,28 which evidently would impact Britain’s stance on 
isolation. The Foreign Office had been reorganised with a Far 
Eastern Department in 1899,29 shortly after Russia’s seizure of Port 
Arthur and Germany’s seizure of Kiaochow.30 Britain wanted an 
open door trade policy of China, which made sense for their 
economic interests, with two-thirds of Chinese foreign trade being 
carried out with Britain.31 This did not marry with Russia’s aims to 
take more land for the Russian Empire, with encroachments already 
made in Manchuria. 32 Despite a far superior navy, Britain’s army 
was ‘puny’ and could never have taken on Russia in the Far East if 
it came to war.33 Furthermore, Russia was threatening Britain’s 
‘crown jewel’ India, through railways to Afghanistan’s frontier,34 
and the loan crisis of Persia in 1900.35 The threat to India through 
Russian attention on these two buffer states, led to elite fears in 
Britain that they should increase their Indian garrison by 100,000 
 
25 Philip Towle, From Ally to Enemy Anglo Japanese Military relations 1900-45 
(Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2006), p. 1. 
26 Young, p. 22. 
27 Otte, The Foreign Office Mind, p. 236. 
28 Taylor, p. 391.  
29 Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The diplomacy of two island empires 
1894-1907 (London: Athlone Press, 1966), p. 61. 
30 Monger, p. 6. 
31 M.R.D Foot, p. 19. 
32 Monger, p. 18. 
33 Young, p. 11. 
34 Towle, p. 1. 
35 For more in-depth discussion of the loan crisis of Persia and how this 
impacted Anglo-Russian relations see Monger, The end of isolation, pp. 50-58. 
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troops.36 The contrasting ambitions of Russia and Britain in Asia, 
coupled with this military weakness of Britain, was a major factor 
in signing the Anglo-Japanese agreement. Britain hoped Japan 
would defend their interests in China because certain terms of the 
treaty alluded to a ‘defence of interests in China or Korea’.37 Britain 
tried to extend the terms to cover Persia, but the Japanese would not 
agree. However, the renewal of the agreement in 1905 covered 
Persia, which highlights the importance of this buffer state to 
Britain.38 Therefore, if one takes the historiographical side, that 
splendid isolation ended with Britain’s alliance with Japan, imperial 
overstretch played a significant role. Britain turned to Japan due to 
engagements in the Far East, Central Asia and Africa around the 
same time, while retaining ad hoc treaties to deal with the Americas. 
     
The Moroccan Crisis 
Imperial overstretch also played a significant role in Britain’s 
decision to side with France in the Moroccan Crisis. In the short-
term, imperial overstretch had almost no impact on Britain’s 
decision to oppose the Kaiser. Britain had already started to become 
suspicious of Germany, not just because of their battlefleet, but also 
because of the ambitious Kaiser’s general ambition of Weltpolitik.39 
Furthermore, Britain’s good faith was on trial with France.40 To 
retain this, Britain had to at least support France in a diplomatic 
sense against Germany. However, considering the longer-term 
build-up to the Moroccan Crisis, imperial overstretch clearly was a 
factor. Britain had historically been concerned with Morocco due to 
its proximity to Gibraltar, one of the ‘five keys’ to the world. 41 More 
importantly, Britain’s ‘trial of faith’ with France was only on the 
line because of the Entente Cordiale between the two nations on 8 
April 1904, despite no binding pledge.42 Principally, Britain joined 
the entente due to imperial overstretch. The Entente Cordiale 
established British legitimacy in Egypt while Britain accepted 
French dominance in Morocco. Regarding Africa, Kennedy 
described it as ‘yet another challenger to the British world position 
 
36 Christopher Clarke, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to war in 1914 
(London: Allen Lane, 2012), p. 139. 
37 Monger, p. 63. 
38 Otte, The Foreign Office Mind, p. 297. 
39 Paul Kennedy, ‘Reflections on Wilhelm II's place in the making of German 
foreign policy', in: John C.G. Röhl/Nicolaus Sombart (Eds.): Kaiser Wilhelm II. 
New Interpretations (London, 1982), p.160. 
40 Taylor, p. 417 
41 Epkenhans, p.116, as described by First Sea Lord, Sir John Fisher. 
42 Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 
(Amherst, 1988), p. 427. 
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satisfied’.43 However, the key factor in Britain joining the Entente 
Cordiale and subsequently the Moroccan Crisis, was again the Far 
East, with the Russo-Japanese War 1904-5. In similar terms to the 
Anglo-Japanese agreement, France had an agreement with Russia, 
that if Russia was attacked by two or more powers they would aid 
the Russians.44 Britain had the same agreement with Japan.45 
Therefore, both France and Britain had a considerable interest in not 
being a third party to the war, as this would mean the other was 
obliged to join. From both perspectives, the Entente was as much 
eliminating the threat of war than it was about making allies.46 Thus, 
imperial overstretch forced Britain into the alliance with Japan. This 
alliance, as well as appeasing colonial disputes in Africa, was behind 
the Entente Cordiale. The agreements with France over Morocco 
then dictated Britain’s policy in the Moroccan Crisis, whereby they 
offered France support. Subsequently, Britain’s involvement in 
European quarrels stemmed from imperial overstretch, primarily in 
the Far East but also in Africa. 
      
Conclusion 
To conclude, the German battlefleet had little impact on Britain 
ending splendid isolation by signing the Anglo-Japanese Agreement 
and was barely a concern to the British Foreign Office and 
policymakers. Anglo-German antagonism was not the major 
determinant of British foreign policy.47 Instead, the alliance was due 
to Britain’s global interests in the Far East and Central Asia, and to 
a lesser extent in Africa and the Americas, becoming too much a 
burden to defend alone. By the time of the Moroccan Crisis, the 
German battlefleet had registered slightly more on Britain’s foreign 
policy. Therefore, the German battlefleet may have played some 
factor in Britain’s opposition to Germany, but this impact would 
have been negligible at most. Britain opposing the Kaiser was 
mainly due to their entente with France, which from the British side 
was yet another example of attempting to administer their imperial 
affairs. This essay has focused mainly on imperial overstretch and 
focused on the German battlefleet only as a secondary factor. This 
is because, no matter which side of the historiographical debate one 
takes (whether splendid isolation ended in 1902 or 1905-6), the main 
reason for the end of splendid isolation was imperial overstretch, not 
the German battlefleet programme. This challenges the traditional 
 
43 Paul Kennedy, The realities behind diplomacy: background influences on 
British external policy, 1865-1980 (London: Fontana Press, 1985), p. 122. 
44 Monger, p. 2. 
45 Ibid, p. 62. 
46 Young, p. 29. 
47 Clarke, The Sleepwalkers, p. 141. 
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historiographical debates on the build-up to the First World War, 
which often prioritise Anglo-German antagonism as the major 
determinant of Great Power politics and subsequently the break-out 
of war. Instead this essay suggests Anglo-German antagonism was 
secondary to other factors, at least in the medium-term build-up to 
the First World War. 
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